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In her book Liquidated Karen Ho offers her readers a unique, insightful, and
engaging picture of the everyday work world of investment bankers who did
the deals to finance corporate America at the turn of the twentieth century. An
anthropologist, Ho digs deeply into the everyday experiences of investment
bankers, including the “origin myths” that contextualized those experiences,
to expose how a culture of liquidity shaped the orientation of investment banks
and in turn, the corporations that they capitalized. Her fieldwork takes place
at a time when “the economy experienced not only record corporate profits and
the longest rising stock market ever, but also record downsizings” (1, emphasis
in the original). It is this fundamental contradiction between corporate profit
and employee insecurity that drove her research. Although her ethnographic
work preceded the current global financial crisis, Ho’s analysis takes on added
importance when refracted through that lens, providing important insights
into the everyday work routines that fueled recklessness and misfeasance, if
not malfeasance, in the financial industry.
Although lawyers are not an explicit part of Ho’s ethnography, the
longstanding relationship between investment banking and elite law firms
and lawyers makes this an important read. Not only are investment banks
important law firm clients, some lawyers worked directly for investment banks
(Robert Rubin is one notable example), and for a time, many more aspired
to do so. The parallels between investment banking and law, while not exact,
are close enough to warrant careful attention and offer additional insights and
questions for our understanding of the legal profession.
In 1996, Ho used her own elite academic connections to secure a management
consultant position with a Wall Street firm that would allow her to learn more
about finance before returning to graduate school to write about Wall Street
culture and its relationship to corporate downsizing. After six months at her
“prefieldwork” site, she was “downsized.” Her “actual fieldwork” took place
after she was let go from her position and included interviews, some shadowing
of bankers, formal and informal networking events, and attendance at industry
conferences from 1996–1999. Although the analysis is updated to offer insight
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into the current financial crisis, readers must be mindful that the Wall Street
culture Ho describes predates the crisis by nearly a decade. Still, those seeking
to make sense of the global financial crisis and how so many “smart” people
could make such drastic mistakes will find some answers in Ho’s work.
Employing the perspective of Bourdieu’s habitus, Ho demonstrates that the
orientation of Wall Street financiers was shaped by their elite education, on
the one hand, and the compensation practices and job insecurity of their own
employment, on the other. Rewarded for doing deals while ever mindful of
the fragility of their employment at any given time, the Wall Street financiers
Ho studied projected their orientation for the liquidity of everything on to the
economy as a whole. Taken in by a culture that manufactured a sense of their
“greatness,” bankers attempted to shape the economy in their own images.
Ironically, by 2008, investment banks were experiencing the dislocation and
restructuring they were recommending for corporate America a decade earlier.
Two chapters of the book are devoted to making sense of the narrative of
shareholder value first as a political and cultural strategy and second, as a
meaning system that investment bankers used to make sense of the world.
Although readers might find this hard going, what distinguishes this part of
the book is Ho’s anthropological perspective on the rich secondary material
about the ascendance of shareholder value, the moment when shareholders
“symbolized and ‘stood in’ for the whole of the corporation and became the sole locus of concern
and analysis” (175, emphasis in the original). Ho argues that shareholder value,
as a particular, albeit now dominant, analytic strategy reinforced a particular
set of Wall Street interests and, in turn, workplace structures and strategies.
While this part of the book is important in demonstrating that many so-called
“core values” of the market are historically situated and socially produced, the
originality of Ho’s analysis comes through in her telling of how these “myths”
become actualized in the working world of investment banks.
Elite pedigrees and the culture of smartness. Ho was a graduate student
at Princeton, one of a handful of “Ivies” from which Wall Street firms
systematically recruit. Her own experience and interviews with her co-workers
demonstrate that firms were recruiting general smartness rather than a set
of technical skills or, even more than, as we suspect to be true in law, social
connections. Although not discounting the value of social capital, particularly
the alumni and peer networks that develop from elite education, Ho’s work
emphasizes the significance of the cultural capital elites bring not simply in
terms of habits and tastes but in terms of generic smarts, the kind of smartness
that “conveys a naturalized and generic sense of ‘impressiveness,’ of elite,
pinnacle status and expertise which is used to signify, even prove, investment
bankers’ worthiness” (40, emphasis added). Technical skills could be learned
on the job. The recruitment process itself combined with orientation sessions
once hired to construct the “hegemonic elitism that produces the ‘expert’
knowledge of financial markets” (41). Rankings among elite universities were
replicated on the street. Whereas Princeton and Harvard graduates were
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assumed to have what it takes to succeed on Wall Street, recruits from the
other Ivies had to demonstrate a particular ability or set of skills. Overall,
the recruitment process created a mutually reinforcing connection between
the market and the Ivy League. The logic went like this: Since Wall Street
recruited the best and the brightest, the decisions and deals emanating from
investment banks had significant value simply because they (the products of
elite Ivies) did them. The global financial crisis may have exposed the fallacy of
such assumptions. Nevertheless, Ho’s nuanced understanding of the value of
elite pedigrees on Wall Street may inform ongoing debates about the value of
elite legal education in the legal profession. The ability to attract the “best and
the brightest,” whatever that actually means in terms of actual skills or even
connections, is likely to remain an important source of power in a profession
that seeks to remain elite.
Overwork as Normative Practice. Lawyers may relate closely to Ho’s
discussion of the rigorous hours and competitive atmosphere of the Wall
Street investment banks. Expectations for 24-hour client management coupled
with the need to cater to more senior banker’s schedules meant that analysts
and associates were at the office well past midnight on a regular basis. The
culture of overwork, fueled by organizational/lifestyle perks such as dinner
and a car service ride home, combined with the culture of smartness to justify
the power and dominance of the Wall Street firms, at least to those who
worked there. Deals were good, indeed right, because smart bankers worked
very hard to get them done (107). The grueling pace of work also justified
the hierarchies within investment banks as well as between investment banks
and other economic actors. Although Ho recognizes a cultural imperative to
“hard work” where women and minorities were offered different opportunities
to prove themselves as hard workers and did not receive the same value for
the hard work they performed, she suggests that working hard, in general,
was a key cultural prop to support short-term finance capitalism.1 “The hard
work needed to forge the smart ‘men of mettle’ who serve as a disciplinary
exemplar of the new prototype of worker under short-term financial capitalism
is itself calibrated on the bodies of unmarked investment bankers”(121). Young
associates at large elite law firms will likely find that they can relate directly to
this analysis.
Compensating Liquidity. The Wall Street Ho entered was characterized
by “drastic and sometimes simultaneous spikes of hiring and firing” (225), a
pattern that persists today. By making sense of their job insecurity as a natural
consequence of unstoppable market forces, Ho’s Wall Street bankers forged
their identity with the market. As there was no job security, the focus was
always on the immediate present. “If you can’t make money today, you are out
of there” (234, emphasis added). Indeed, Wall Street bankers came to embody
1.

She acknowledges in passing that overwork is a dominant feature for many lower and middle
class workers so that bankers’ efforts to distinguish themselves by their grueling hours is a bit
self serving.
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the market “as the ultimate ‘liquid’ employee”(252), exchanging compensation
for job security. They were paid well for the uncertainty (riskiness) of what was
more a financial relationship than a career (273).
A key feature of Wall Street compensation is the bonus. Although the Wall
Street bonus has come under media scrutiny in the current financial crisis, the
bonus is not well understood on Wall Street or in law practice. In the high
flying days that preceded the crisis, bonuses were linked to “deal flow,” i.e.,
moving money, regardless of whether the transactions resulted in anything
productive (268). Induced by the promises of the bonus, investment bankers
strove to make the most out of the present, and in doing so created a “bubble
culture of expediency,” devoid of long-term strategic thinking. The culture
of smartness, overwork, and job insecurity combined with a compensation
system rewarding expediency and liquidity to “enact shareholder value the
way they [bankers] themselves experience it—through their own, Wall Streetcentric cultural lens…[is] detrimental to shareholder value in the long run”
(293). Most importantly, Ho found that bonuses structured bankers’ lifestyles
and the understanding of their own worth (263). It is no wonder, then, that
bonuses still hold traction as a method of retaining talent in the face of the
global financial meltdown.
There are parallels here to large law firm practice, of course. Job security
has become more elusive. Compensation is hardly linked to performance as
young associates are hired for what seem outrageous sums given their lack of
substantive skill. Yet compensation at law firms lagged that of the investment
banks at the time, suggesting that there may be more than a financial
relationship at play in the case of law. While some young lawyers may make
sense of the high starting salaries and job insecurity in large law firms as part of
an exchange to pay back debt quickly, it is not clear that compensation in law
demonstrates market forces in the same way as it does in investment banks.
Other professional values, e.g., the value of “service,” may co-exist with the
market to organize compensation in law.
The power of the Ho’s analysis comes from her insider status. But that
insider status presents a weakness as well. As a member of the elite culture she
attempts to critique, one wonders whether she, too, drank the Kool-Aid and
perhaps overstates the significance of the investment bankers’ ability to shape
the economy. Given that there is little context for the interviews and accounts
she offers, it is hard to feel completely comfortable that the picture she paints
covers investment banks as a whole or only the most elite among them.
Moreover, there is no counterpoint to the banker’s frame, although clearly
other elite professionals played a role in doing deals and surely challenged
and/or further supported the framework that organizes the bankers’ work.
Derivative product groups were beginning to emerge in Wall Street firms at
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that time2 and one wonders whether the culture of the traders and the “quants”
who were manufacturing and selling these products was different enough
and significant enough to put competitive pressure, short-lived as it might
be, on those doing deals. Without a picture of competition within the field,
something seems missing from her analysis of investment bankers’ habitus that
would strengthen our understanding of the persistence of the elite Wall Street
culture she describes.
Taken on its own terms, the book demonstrates that the study of everyday
work experiences can shed significant light on the power of institutions.
Although scholars of the legal profession have addressed many of the issues
discussed in the book, there are few contemporary ethnographies of large law
firms that directly link workplace structures and strategies to the larger values
and interest of the profession as a whole. Analyses of the kind and depth
found in Ho’s Liquidity seem particularly important as we enter a “second
transformation” of the legal profession.3 In the face of ever more market
pressures in law, Ho’s analysis of elite investment banks leads us to ask what
particular orientations and interests are being served by the culture of the large
law firm. How are law firm structures and practices shaped by those interests
and, in turn, in what ways do everyday routines reinforce those interests? Is
law large law firm practice similarly focused on creating a worldview of elite
importance irrespective of the work that is being done? Will large law firms
find themselves hoisted on their own petard, temporarily, as Ho suggests was
the fate of investment banks, only to re-emerge because of their elite status?
What narratives and “origin myths” organize law practice, particularly at large
law firms, to reinforce their sense of preeminence and importance?
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